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Assessing Potential Insurance Claims for Business Interruptions and Civil Authority Coverage Stemming from the Covid-19 Virus

By: John Bond Atkinson, Tiffany A. Bustamante, and Joshua Lopez

We hope this article finds you in good health and spirit. During this very difficult time, and in response to emerging and uncertain legal developments arising from the coronavirus pandemic, Atkinson, P.A. remains dedicated and available to advise, address, and support your legal concerns.

Executive Summary

Along with changing our daily lives, the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19)2 has already started to reshape the legal landscape. This article will highlight the possible effects of the COVID-19 virus on the insurance industry, specifically with respect to business interruption and civil authority coverage/claims. As explained below, Florida state and Florida Federal courts have not yet provided much guidance regarding pandemics, and related legal issues such as business interruption and government action/ordinances affecting such coverage (otherwise known as civil authority coverage).3 Thus, navigating the legal challenges arising from this global pandemic will require a global search for answers.

The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit provides insight into civil authority coverage as it relates to the closing of international borders and its effects on supply chain. The Hong Kong Court of First Appearance and its Court of Final Appeal provide some insight into how this coronavirus may be handled by our judiciary, through its handling of a case regarding the first-identified strain of a novel coronavirus, SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1). Accordingly, we provide you with a review of how prior courts have addressed these issues, as these cases may soon serve as persuasive authority to our Florida courts.

This article comes on the heels of a month of firsts within the realm of business interruption and civil authority coverage. On March 17, 2020, a New Orleans restaurant filed a first-of-its-kind lawsuit, which has been quickly followed by lawsuits around the country at the state and federal levels, asking a state judge to hold that its property and business interruption policy with Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London would cover its losses due to government-mandated closures tied to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus.4

On March 18, 2020, the following day, a bipartisan coalition of eighteen members of the U.S. House of Representatives corresponded with leading insurance trade organizations, advocating for insurers to provide coverage for business interruptions caused by the COVID-19 virus, under existing commercial property policies. U.S. Representative for Florida’s 20th congressional district, Alcee Hastings, was a signatory to the aforementioned letter, which was sent to insurance industry leaders.

Efforts to address insurance coverage issues stemming from the viral pandemic are beginning to emerge across the country’s state legislatures. Notably, as of Friday, March 20, 2020, negotiations surrounding New Jersey General Assembly Bill A3844 were still ongoing. As the bill is currently written, it would effectively rewrite existing policies to include “coverage for business interruption due to global virus transmission or pandemic” for policies issued before March 9, 2020, to New Jersey businesses with fewer than 100 full-time employees.5 This has been met with pushback from insurers, as federal and state governments seemingly attempt to alter or impair the contractual relations and obligations between parties by essentially retroactively rewriting the insurance contracts. Thus far, Ohio, Massachusetts, and New York have followed New Jersey by introducing bills addressing business interruption insurance policies in the wake of the COVID-19 virus.

State insurance departments have also acted to address the crisis. For example, on March 10, 2020, New York’s Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) issued a letter to all New York property and casualty insurers demanding that they provide certain information regarding the commercial property policies issued in New York and provide an explanation of the business interruption coverage provided by the policies. The insurers were to provide this explanation to both insureds and the NYDFS by no later than March 18, 2020.

Though at present, Florida has not issued a similar letter. On March 16, 2020, the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (“OIR”) issued a memorandum directing all insurers to review and update their business continuity and/or continuity of operations plans.6 Insurers were advised to “consider all potential impacts of COVID-19 within their continuity plan, including impacts to essential operations, key personnel, supply chain, vendors, contractors and policyholders.” In addition, insurers must notify the OIR on the same day that they (1) activate their business continuity and/or continuity of operations plans, or (2) determine that business operations are compromised to the extent that it jeopardizes the ability to provide essential services to policyholders.

Business Interruptions and Civil Authority Coverage 

Property and liability insurers are bracing for an uptick in claims across virtually every line of coverage due to the pandemic. At the outset, we would like to briefly outline issues related to business interruption and civil authority coverage/claims. The first case concerns a typical business interruptions case and “perils excluded” provisions. The next, a case concerning supply chain issues and the closing of international borders. Lastly, we examine the SARS case from Hong Kong.

I. Property Damage as a Prerequisite for Business Interruption Coverage and Excluded Perils7

In the Florida case of Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Texpak Group N.V.,8 the Third District Court of Appeal provided guidance regarding the traditional circumstances triggering business interruption coverage. In Texpak, a joint venturer hired a Spanish company to design and install an updated “wet” end to its mill. Within weeks of the upgrade, the joint venturer discovered serious defects in the design and installation and after many months of attempting to resolve the deficiencies, finally shut the plant down. The joint ventured sought recovery of its economic losses from its carrier under the “ensuing loss exception” to the “design defect exclusion” of the insurance policy. The insurance policy at issue was an “all-risk” policy, as opposed to an “all loss” policy.9 The relevant policy language is outlined below:


This policy insures against all risk of physical loss of or damage to property described herein . . . except as excluded.


This policy does not insure:

*      *      *      *      *

D. against the cost of making good defective design or specifications . . . .

[This policy does not insure] . . . against the cost of making good defective design or specifications . . .; however, this exclusion shall not apply to loss or damage resulting from such defective design or specifications . . . .

Except as hereinafter excluded, this policy covers:

A. Real and Personal Property

*      *      *      *      *

 B. Business Interruption

(1) Loss resulting from necessary interruption of business . . . caused by loss . . .covered herein . . . to real and personal property . . . .

 *      *      *      *      *

D. Extra Expense

(1) Extra Expense incurred resulting from loss . . . covered herein . . . to real or personal property . . . .

The Third DCA held that the ensuing loss exception provided no coverage for the joint venturer’s economic losses. The Court explained that, generally, there must be an interruption of business “which is caused by property loss or damage which was itself produced by a peril covered in the property protection provisions.”10 Although the insurance policy stated that it covered all risks, it did not cover all losses and expressly excluded the “cost of making good defective design or specifications.” Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the policy, business interruption and extra expense losses were covered only if “resulting from” damage or destruction of real or personal property caused by a covered peril. Since defective design or specifications were not perils covered by the policy, economic damage or loss resulting from those causes were excluded from coverage as well.

The Texpak case is significant to the extent many business interruption policies since the SARS outbreak were written to explicitly exclude perils in connection with communicable, infectious and/or notifiable diseases. In fact, in 2006, Insurance Services Office Inc. (“ISO”), issued form CP 01 40 07 06 titled “Exclusion for Loss Due To Virus Or Bacteria,” which reads in pertinent part as follows:

A. The exclusion set forth in Paragraph B. applies to all coverage under all forms and endorsements that comprise this Coverage Part or Policy, including but not limited to forms or endorsements that cover property damage to buildings or personal property and forms or endorsements that cover business income, extra expense or action of civil authority.

B. We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease.

Then again, in February of this year, ISO drafted two coverage forms in response to the coronavirus pandemic: (1) Business Interruption: Limited Coverage for Certain Civil Authority Orders Relating to Coronavirus and (2) Business Interruption: Limited Coverage for Certain Civil Authority Orders Relating to Coronavirus (Including Orders Restricting Some Modes of Public Transportation). Neither form is numbered.11 In a similar vein, ISO issued Ebola Virus endorsement forms in 2014. The first endorsement offers coverage for the loss of income a business faces when it follows orders to close during an Ebola outbreak. The second endorsement responds if the government suspends public bus, rail, or ferry lines. Both options are designed to complement ISO’s commercial property program and are subject to an annual aggregate. They may also provide coverage when an order to close disrupts a company’s supply chain.

II. The Closing of Borders by Civil Authority and its Affect on Business Interruption Coverage.

In 2003, Mad Cow Disease caused the closure of the border between United States and Canada. That experience may provide guidance regarding the closing of borders by civil authority and its affect on business interruption coverage. In Source Food,12 a Minnesota company’s (the “insured”) sole supplier of beef product came from Canada. The insured would then use this beef product to produce cooking oil that was sold within the United States. The insured ordered a shipment of beef product just prior to the United States Department of Agriculture’s (“USDA”) prohibition on the importation of beef products from Canada. The order was manufactured, packaged and placed in a shipping truck, but was not shipped due to USDA’s embargo. The product in the truck was conceded to not be contaminated by Mad Cow Disease. However, the embargo caused the insured to lose that shipment, lose its sole supplier and ultimately lose its biggest contract due to inability to perform. The insured then sued on the insurance policy and “argue[d] that the closing of the border caused direct physical loss to its beef product because the beef product was treated as though it were physically contaminated by Mad Cow Disease and lost its function.”

The insurance policy provided coverage for the loss of business income where there is direct physical loss to the insured’s property:

(1) “Business income.” We will pay the actual loss of “business income” you sustain due to the necessary suspension of your “operations” during the “period of restoration.” The suspension must be caused by direct physical loss to Property (other than those items listed in SECTION I.A.2.), including Property Off Premises, and result from any Covered Cause of Loss . . . .

(4) Action by Civil Authority. We will pay for the actual loss of “business income” you sustain and necessary “extra expense” caused by action of civil authority that prohibits access to the described premises due to direct physical loss to property, other than at the described premises, caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.

(Emphasis added). In this case, the court focused on the language “physical loss to [p]roperty” as opposed to physical loss of property. The court reasoned that because there was no direct physical loss to the beef product, there was no coverage provided by the policy. With regard to supply chain interruptions, “[t]o characterize [the insured]’s inability to transport its truckload of beef product across the border and sell the beef product in the United States as direct physical loss to property would render the word ‘physical’ meaningless.”
Of significance specifically with regard to the COVID-19 virus, one of the cases that the insured relied upon—which was distinguished by the Court—held that the presence of asbestos “constituted direct physical loss to the properties because ‘a building’s function may be seriously impaired or destroyed and the property rendered useless by the presence of contaminants.’”13 Extrapolating to the COVID-19 virus, some courts may be persuaded by arguments that the presence of the virus on or in a property may seriously impair same and/or render said property useless.14

III. Infectious Disease as a Covered Peril and its Affect on Business Interruption Coverage.

The last case highlighted in this article is New World Harbourview Hotel Company Limited v Ace Insurance Limited.15 This case is of significance because the insurance policy at issue included infectious disease as a covered peril and it is the sole case litigated with regard to the first-identified strain of the coronavirus. The case revolved around the original SARS outbreak in Hong Kong. The insureds/plaintiffs in this matter (a collective of owner/operators of convention centers, hotels, car parks and related businesses) sued their insurance carriers in respect of business interruption loss suffered as a result of the outbreak of SARS in Hong Kong in 2003.16

Several issues were raised, but for the purposes of this discussion, we focus on the interpretation of the insurance policy’s business interruption clause and the subsequent loss period. The relevant language of the insurance policy states:

This Policy is extended to insure actual loss sustained by the Insured, resulting from a Reduction in Revenue and increase in Cost of Working as a result of murder, suicide, infectious or contagious disease, food or drink poisoning or contamination, and closure by a competent authority due to vermin or pests all occurring on the Premises of the Insured or of notifiable human infectious or contagious disease occurring within 25 miles of the Premises.

The policy at issue provided coverage for infections or contagious disease “occurring on the Premises.” This would force an insured to prove that the coronavirus was present within their premises, causing physical damage or closure from a civil authority; a tall task which invariably leads to a battle of the parties’ experts.17 As SARS did not occur on the insureds’ premises, the critical issue in dispute was when did SARS become a “notifiable” disease for the purposes of insurance coverage. Below is the timetable with regard to SARS in Hong Kong:

▪ On February 22, 2003, AA [SARS-CoV-1 patient zero] was admitted to Kwong Wah Hospital. He died on 4 March 2003. He was confirmed as having had SARS in mid-April 2003.
▪ On March 10, 2003, some 11 health workers in Ward 8A of Princess of Wales Hospital went on sick leave simultaneously.
▪ On March 12, 2003, WHO [the World Health Organization] placed the international community on high alert about cases of acute respiratory syndrome in Hong Kong, Guangdong and Vietnam.
▪ On March 15, 2003, WHO issued an emergency travel advisory statement. This identified the disease as “SARS” for the first time. WHO declared SARS to be a worldwide health threat.
▪ On March 22, 2003, scientists identified a previously unknown corona virus as the cause of SARS.
▪ On March 26, 2003, the Department of Health was notified of the admission into hospital of 15 persons with suspected SARS. All 15 resided in the Amoy Gardens housing estate.
▪ On March 27, 2003, the Hong Kong Government announced new measures to control the spread of SARS. Among other things, SARS was added to the list of infectious diseases in the 1st Schedule to the Quarantine and Prevention of Diseases Ordinance (Cap.141) (the Ordinance). As a result, it became mandatory for SARS cases to be notified to the Government.
▪ On April 2, 2003, WHO advised persons against travelling to Hong Kong.
▪ The number of SARS cases began to abate from mid-April 2003.
▪ On June 23, 2003, the SARS epidemic was officially declared as over. WHO removed Hong Kong from its list of places with recent local SARS transmissions. This was because no new SARS cases had been identified in Hong Kong within the preceding 20 days.

The Hong Kong Court ultimately determined that SARS became a notifiable disease within the meaning of the insurance policy on March 27, 2003 (the date it became a legal requirement for SARS cases to be notified to the government under statutory provisions). The Court reasoned that “notifiable” . . . “here imports a legal or mandatory requirement to notify.” Though the insureds may have experienced an interruption of business due to rumors, reports, travel advisories, travel postponements, or resident isolation, the Court held that to allow recovery before the notifiable disease designation would be impermissible because “notifiable” in the policy was unambiguous, even in the face of contra proferentem. The Court stated that the parties were not allowed to use subsequent events to construe the policy, and instead were restricted to the purview of the factual matrix known at the time of the policy’s formation.
With respect to the duration of the “Loss Period” (which was defined as “the period . . . from the date of loss to the resumption of the business and thence 180 days”), the Court held that “resumption of the business” presumes that an insured business was interrupted or temporarily stopped and subsequently re-opened or “resumed.” Since the insureds’ businesses did not cease to operate, the loss period would be 180 days from the date of commencement of loss.

In sum, based upon the wording of the policy, the virus/disease because “notifiable” when it became a legal requirement for SARS cases to be notified to the government under statutory provisions, notwithstanding the fact that SARS would have affected the revenue of the insureds before that date. As of the writing of this article, WHO has designated the disease as a global pandemic and several nations/states have classified the COVID-19 virus as a notifiable disease, (i.e. the United Kingdom, Ireland, China, the states of Alabama and Rhode Island), however, the COVID-19 virus is not specifically designated as a notifiable disease by the United States.18 To the extent an insurance policy contains infectious/notifiable diseases as a covered peril, insurers are urged to monitor when the United States or its local state government classifies the COVID-19 virus as a notifiable disease in connection with business interruptions claims, which will surely arise out of the current pandemic.

The New World case also highlights the distinction between the diminution in business versus business interruption. Specifically, diminution in business does not necessarily trigger business interruption coverage.19

What’s Next?

Disputes over business interruption and civil authority coverage tied to the COVID-19 virus should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis depending on the language of each insurance policy. While this discussion has provided you with a review of how courts in other jurisdictions have addressed these issues, we are treading in an uncertain legal landscape and prior precedent is no guarantee of what courts and legislatures will do in an attempt to ease unprecedented economic losses.

Atkinson, P.A. is committed to providing you with sound guidance and representation in response to the complex coverage issues presented by the coronavirus outbreak. We continue to monitor CDC guidelines, court developments, regulatory activity, and public sector announcements; and will continue to circulate articles with respect to the latest news and analysis of potential insurance claims and disputes stemming from the COVID-19 virus in the upcoming weeks.

While our office continues to remain open in limited capacity, each of our attorneys remain fully available to assist you. As needs arise, continue to contact us via telephone or e-mail. Should you need immediate assistant, please feel free to contact our partners directly.

John Bond Atkinson: 561-212-4089

Tiffany A. Bustamante: 305-431-7497

John B. Atkinson: 561-289-2331

1 This information is intended to inform firm clients and friends about legal developments, including recent decisions of various courts and administrative bodies. Nothing in this Client Update should be construed as legal advice or a legal opinion, and readers should not act upon the information contained in this Client Update without seeking the advice of legal counsel. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
2 The official name for the virus (previously referred to as “2019 novel coronavirus”) is severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and the disease it causes is coronavirus disease (COVID-19). For the purpose of this discussion, we will refer to the 2019 novel coronavirus as “the COVID-19 virus” and/or “SARS-CoV-2.”
3 Queen Ins. Co. v. Patterson Drug Co., 73 Fla. 665 (Fla. 1917) and Indian River State Bank v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 35 So. 228 (Fla. 1903) are the only Florida Supreme Court cases dealing with a policy that contains civil authority language. While the clauses of the policies sued upon mention civil authority, the cases themselves do not revolve around civil authority.
4 Cajun Conti, LLC, et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, et al., Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. Subsequently, the same lawyer representing Cajun Conti, LLC has filed suit on behalf of celebrity chef Thomas Keller on Wednesday, March 25, 2020. The case was filed in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of Napa, and is styled, French Laundry Partners, LP dba The French Laundry, et al. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, et al. Complaints have also been filed in a Houston, Texas state court and in Chicago, Illinois’ federal court with respect to the denial of business interruptions coverage claims, e.g. Barbara Lane Snowden DBA Hair Goals Club v. Twin Cities Fire Ins. Co. and Onion Tavern Group, LLC, et al. v. Society Insurance, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-02005 (N.D. Ill. March 27, 2020).
6 The memorandum applies to all insurance companies regulated by OIR. That does not include insurance agencies or brokers, which are regulated by the Florida Department of Financial Services.                                                                                                                                                                                       7 It is the plaintiff’s burden to prove “entitlement to business interruption insurance proceeds under the insurance policy.” See Dictiomatic, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 958 F. Supp. 594, 603 (S.D. Fla. 1997). Dependent on the specific policy language at issue, a plaintiff must prove the following to satisfy this burden: (1) a direct physical loss occurred to the insured property, (2) the direct physical loss was caused by a peril covered by the policy, (3) a necessary “suspension” of the insured’s “operations” occurred, (4) the “suspension” was caused by the covered direct physical loss, (5) there was an “actual loss of business income” during a “period of restoration,” and (6) the “actual loss of income” was caused by the “suspension” of “operations.” See Mama Jo’s Inc. v. Sparta Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201852 (S.D. Fla. June 11, 2018) (paraphrasing Dictiomatic, 958 F. Supp. at 602); see also Evanston Ins. Co. v. Haven S. Beach, LLC, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (holding “[a] person seeking to recover on an insurance policy has the burden of proving a loss from causes within the terms of the policy[,] and if such proof of loss is made within the contract of insurance, the burden is on the insurer to establish that the loss arose from a cause that is excepted from the policy.”); see also Companhia Energetica Potiguar v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 14-cv-24277, 2016 WL 7507848, at 13 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2016) (holding that the plaintiff carries the burden of proving causation to show that there was a direct physical loss and thus coverage under the Policy.))
8 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Texpak Group N.V., 906 So. 2d 300 (Fla. DCA 3d 2005).
9 Unlike all-loss policies, all-risk policies usually contain exclusions as to the risks assumed by the insurer.
10 Texpak, 906 So. 2d at 301-02 (quoting 11 Couch on Insurance 3d, § 167:12 (1998 ed.)).                                                                                                               11   12 Source Food Tech., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 465 F.3d 834 (Cir. 8th 2006).
13 Sentinel Mgmt. Co. v. N. H. Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 296, 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
14 See Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding “[w]hen the presence of large quantities of asbestos in the air of a building is such as to make the structure uninhabitable and unusable, then there has been a distinct loss to its owner.”); see also Gregory Packaging, Inc. v. Travelers Property and Casualty Company of America, No. 12-cv-04418, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165232 (D.N.J. Nov. 25, 2014) (holding that the presence of ammonia was sufficient to prove that the insured incurred a “physical loss of or damage to” to its facility when ammonia gas was discharged into the facility’s air and rendered the facility temporarily unfit for occupancy. However, the “insured must still prove that the damage was caused by or resulted from a ‘Covered Cause of Loss’ and was not excluded under the policy’s terms.”); c.f. Mama Jo’s, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201852 (S.D. Fla. June 11, 2018) (holding “[t]he fact that the [premises] needed to be cleaned more frequently does not mean Plaintiff suffered a direct physical loss or damage.”) (relying on MRI Healthcare Ctr. of Glendale, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 187 Cal. App. 4th 766, 779 (2010)) (holding construction debris that could be cleaned did not constitute direct physical loss).
15 HCA 46/2007, 15 HKCFAR 120.
16 Coincidentally, SARS-CoV-1 and Mad Cow Disease were prevalent at the same time.
17 See Mama Jo’s, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 201852 (holding that “without its experts, Plaintiff cannot show that the construction dust and debris from 2014 caused the alleged “direct physical loss” to their [property]”).
18 See “Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-associated Coronavirus Disease (SARS-CoV)” as a notifiable disease. However, SARS-CoV was defined in 2003 and has not been updated since 2010. “The 2003 case definition appearing on this page was re-published in the 2009 CSTE position statement 09-ID-11. Thus, the 2003 and 2010 versions of the case definition are identical.” This is clearly well before the inception of today’s current pandemic and before SARS-CoV-1 became known as such with the inception of SARS-Cov-2. At present, there has been no update regarding a notifiable designation by the CDC specifically regarding SARS-CoV-2, unlike the countries and states referenced herein. In light of this, ambiguity may arise because the listed notifiable period for SARS-CoV is 2003 to current year. Further, SARS-CoV-2 is a “severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus disease,” albeit a different disease caused by a different coronavirus. Whether SARS-CoV-2 is a notifiable disease at the time of this publication will be left for the judiciary to decide.)
19 See Hotel Properties, Ltd. v. Heritage Ins. Co., 456 So. 2d 1249, 1250, (Fla. DCA 3d 1984) (holding that a diminution in business did not constitute a business interruption within the policy in question) (relying on Pacific Coast Engineering Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 9 Cal.App.3d 270, 88 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1970)(purpose of business interruption insurance is to indemnify for loss due to inability to continue to use specified premises); Rothenberg v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 115 Ga. App. 26, 153 S.E.2d 447 (1967) (recovery under business interruption policy denied where theft of merchandise resulted in loss of business; court held insured had not suffered an interruption of business, but rather a diminution in volume); Howard Stores Corp. v. Foremost Insurance Co., 82 A.D.2d 398, 441 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1981), aff’d, 56 N.Y.2d 991, 439 N.E.2d 397, 453 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1982) (recovery denied for water damage to business where there was no actual suspension of business, but rather an alleged adverse effect on continuing sales); accord National Children’s Expositions Corp. v. Anchor Insurance Co., 279 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1960) (recovery denied under insured’s use and occupancy policy for reduction in attendance due to severe snowstorm, since building was open during entire period in question; court held recovery unavailable in absence of interruption in use and occupancy of building)).

This highlights the need for careful review of insurance policies on a case-by-case basis. See Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 463, 469 (App. 2010) (distinguishing some of the policies cited in supra note 20 and the policy language at issue, i.e. “loss resulting directly from necessary interruption of business, whether total or partial,” as possibly providing coverage for a diminution of business. However, summary judgement was affirmed for the insurers on different matters); see also New World, HCA 46/2007 (plaintiffs were able to recover some monies for their reduction of business for 180 days after the commencement date of coverage under a reduction of revenue policy provision. This recovery was calculated via the previous twelve months of revenue before the commencement date of coverage, notwithstanding the alleged loss of business which occurred between the period of the inception of SARS-CoV-1 and the date SARS-CoV-1 became a “notifiable” disease.)